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Abstract 
 
Extended deterrence is widely researched by many authors. Most of these authors make 
explicit or inexplicit use of the Two-Party Extended Deterrence Game, which analyses 
extended deterrence along the lines of Challenger and Defender. Stephen Quackenbush 
developed the Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game to include a third player to the model. 
In Quackenbush’ model the Protégé is included as a strategic player that has influence on 
deterrence success. This thesis analyses the role of the Protégé in extended deterrence to 
see if the Protégé plays a significant role in determining deterrence success. Quackenbush 
did not include all possibilities in his Three-Party model. This thesis further elaborates on his 
model and adds an additional decision for the Defender to still resist the Challenger even if 
the Protégé chooses to concede. The findings indicate that the Protégé is not a significant 
actor in determining extended deterrence success, as the analysis of the Three-Party Model 
indicated that deterrence was only successful if at least the Defender had a credible threat.  
 
Introduction 
In 1939 Great Britain and France failed to deter Germany from invading Poland, which 
resulted in World War II. Historical records show that when major powers tried to prevent 
one another from attacking a third state, failing to do so resulted in war. This has been the 
case for almost all of the major wars in history. This means that almost all major power 
conflicts resulted from the failure of extended deterrence. When one major power 
(Defender) seeks to deter another major power (Challenger) from using military force 
against one of its allies (Protégé), deterrence theorists speak of extended deterrence 
(Danilovic 2002, 53). Deterrence Theory therefore seeks to explain how wars are prevented. 
 
 Deterrence Theory has been widely debated since its inception. The theory has a 
strong link with Rational Choice and Game Theory and has its roots in the Cold War when 
Game Theoretic models sought to explain nuclear deterrence and the concept of Mutual 
Assured Destruction (MAD). Deterrence, as a concept, is seen as the capacity of one state 
(Defender) to deter another state (Challenger) from attacking, meaning that the Defender 
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can convince the Challenger that the cost of the use of military force to achieve foreign 
policy outweighs the benefits. This threat must be perceived as credible for deterrence to 
actually be ‘deterrence’ and the threats must be explicit so the Challenger does not have to 
guess about the intentions of the Defender. When the Defender state prevents the 
Challenger from initiating or escalating a conflict with an ally of the Defender (Protégé), the 
concept of deterrence evolves into extended deterrence. 
 
 Most studies within Deterrence Theory focus on the concept of extended deterrence. 
The main explanation why extended deterrence has been so widely researched is also 
rooted in the Cold War. During the Cold War the United States (Defender) guaranteed the 
security of its allies (Protégé) against the Soviet Union (Challenger). Given the assumption 
that Europe would be the victim of a potential Russian nuclear attack, extended deterrence 
grew to be the main research topic within Deterrence Theory. Extended deterrence 
therefore is the prevention of the use of military force of a potential enemy, not against the 
Defender itself, but against a third party (Snyder 1961, 17). Several researchers have tried to 
analyse the criteria that constitute to the success or failure of extended deterrence (Huth 
and Russet 1984; Huth 1988; Lebow and Stein 1989; Danilovic 2002) and so a debate has 
emerged between several of these authors.  
  
 Many of these authors argue that “the role of the pawn in extended deterrence does 
not model the pawn as one of the players” (Kilgour and Zagare 1994), which means that 
when the Challenger chooses to attack the Protégé, the Protégé will always retaliate, 
therefore it is not relevant to analyse the role of the protégé in an extended deterrence 
model (Werner 2000, 723). This thesis, however, will focus on the assumption by Stephen 
Quackenbush (2006) that the Protégé does play a role in an extended deterrence 
framework, and that the role of the protégé can offer new insights into the debate between 
Huth and Lebow over which criteria constitute to deterrence success.  
  
 The research question of this thesis is: does the Protégé play a significant role in 
determining extended deterrence success? To answer this question I will first explain the 
theoretical framework of Deterrence Theory: what is deterrence? What is the difference 
between the Two-level Extended Deterrence Game and the Three-Level Extended 
Mark Feenstra  Bachelor Thesis: Deterrence 
 
 
3 
Deterrence Game and what is at stake? Second, I will contemplate on the research method 
used for this thesis. By executing a concept analysis I hope to further specify the concept 
extended deterrence by analysing the role of the Protégé in determining deterrence success. 
Third, I will deeply analyse the Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game of Quackenbush and 
add my own insights to his model. And finally I will conclude by seeing whether the role of 
the protégé plays a significant role in determining deterrence success and whether this 
conclusion would give new insights to the debate between Paul Huth and Richard Lebow.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
“Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and 
the assessment of these by the potential aggressor. Moreover, 
deterrence is a product of those factors and not a sum. If any of 
them is zero, deterrence fails” (Kissinger 1957, 12) 
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Deterrence Debate 
Deterrence Theory has been widely debated by several authors over the past decades. As a 
consequence, several workable definitions of deterrence can be identified. These definitions 
will be discussed below.  
Patrick Morgan defines deterrence as the capacity of one state (Defender) to prevent 
‘something’ from another state (potential Challenger). Usually this ‘something’ means the 
prevention of war, however, Morgan enlarges this definition by stating that deterrence is 
also used to keep wars from getting worse, or to prevent confrontations in which war could 
readily erupt (2003, 117). Furthermore, Morgan separated immediate deterrence from 
general deterrence. Immediate deterrence is a situation where one side is seriously 
considering an attack, while the other side attempts to deter this possible attack with the 
threat of retaliation. General deterrence is a situation where opposing states build-up their 
military as a deterrent, even though neither side is considering an attack (Morgan 1983, 30). 
General deterrence is often seen as the Security Dilemma.  
Paul Huth (1988) uses the definition of deterrence that was first issued by Michael 
Howard. Howard said that deterrence is the ability of one state (Defender) to convince 
adversaries (potential Challenger) that the cost of the use of military force to achieve foreign 
policy will outweigh the benefits (1982-83, 315). Extended deterrence is defined by Huth as 
the situation where one state (Defender) threatens to use military force against another 
state (potential Challenger) in an attempt to prevent the potential Challenger from using 
military force against an ally that is protected by the Defender (Protégé). When extended-
immediate deterrence arises, there is an immediate threat where the potential attacker is 
either actively considering the use of force against a Protégé of the Defender, whose 
policymakers are aware of the threats, causing them to try and deter the potential attacker 
from using military force by threatening to retaliate (Huth 1988, 424). Huth also 
conceptualizes general deterrence, which he sees as an adversarial relationship between 
states, where there is no direct threat of war, but where the threat could culminate as an 
arms race and/or the formation of alliances (1988, 424). Here, the Security Dilemma can 
again be recognized. 
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Paul Huth and Bruce Russet (1984) did and extensive research into the criteria that 
constitute to deterrence success by examining fifty-four cases of extended deterrence. Huth 
and Russet used Morgan’s criteria to select and identify relevant cases, which state that: 
(1) The Challenger is considering attacking a state (Protégé) that is an ally of a third  
       state (Defender); 
(2) The Defender state realizes that the Challenger is considering the attack; 
(3) This realization must lead to the explicit movement of military forces or threats of 
       retaliation by the Defender state. 
Morgan’s fourth criterion, which required that “the leaders of the attacker state desist 
primarily because of the retaliatory threat”, was not used by Huth and Russet. They stated 
that this would be a variable that is too hard to test. They opinioned, however, that this 
requirement was probably present in most of their cases (Huth & Russet 1984, 498).  
Richard Lebow and Janice Stein replied in 1990 that if the cases were correctly 
classified, only nine of the fifty-four cases were legitimate examples of extended immediate 
deterrence – that thirty-seven were not, four were examples of compellence and four were 
hard to classify. The debate between Huth and Russet, and Lebow and Stein shows that the 
question when deterrence is successful is hard to answer. Morgan (2003) concludes that 
research into deterrence and deterrence success therefore is subjective to the researchers 
interpretation.  
Lebow and Stein (1989) define deterrence as the success of one state (Defender) to 
prevent potential Challengers from initiating action. This is done by explicitly attempting to 
prevent the use or deployment of military force of potential challengers trough the threat of 
retaliation. Lebow and Stein argue that the use of Rational Choice Theory to explain 
deterrence success and failure is inadequate, as they argue that in several cases leaders 
estimated the expected costs of war as very high, the probability of winning as low, and the 
probability that the Defender would retaliate as certain, yet still challenged deterrence 
(Lebow & Stein 1989, 211). They argued that these cases affect the predictive validity of 
Rational Deterrence Theory, as it was hard to predict estimated outcomes.  
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Lebow and Stein argue that Deterrence succeeds when there are explicit attempts by 
the Defender to prevent the use of military force and Challengers consider backing down 
from initiating action as they are convinced that the outcome of challenging the Defender’s 
threat would outweigh the benefits for its foreign policy goals. Determining deterrence 
success therefore should include Morgan’s fourth criterion, although Lebow and Stein 
argued that it would still not be enough to identify viable cases of extended deterrence. 
Lebow and Stein argued that the success of deterrence comes down to the defender’s 
capabilities and credibility of retaliation, which causes several cases identified by Huth and 
Russet to be the result of their interpretation of the situation, as leaders of a Challenger 
state are likely to avoid speaking or writing about an opponent’s success in deterring them 
(Lebow & Stein 1989, 222).  
Morgan has analysed the debate between Huth and Russet, and Lebow and Stein and 
tried to find the middle ground between their positions. Huth and Russet left the concept of 
compellence1 out of their research. They opinioned that deterrence is often compared to 
compellence (carrot-and-stick policy), but it does not examine the results from issuing 
threats to get a state to change its foreign policy (Huth and Russet 1984). Lebow and Stein 
argue that four of the fifty-four cases used by Huth and Russet were examples of 
compellence instead of deterrence and therefore their theoretical perception of the concept 
had to be flawed (Lebow and Stein 1987). Morgan argues that while it is true that a carrot 
carries an implied threat (to cancel it), adding compellence to the theory of deterrence 
would destroy its coherence as a concept (Morgan 2003, 119). The fact that Huth and Russet 
based their identification of cases on three of the four criteria that Morgan identified further 
complicates the debate of who is right and who is wrong.  
 Vesna Danilovic (2002) also executed an extensive case study into whether and when 
deterrence succeeds. She defines deterrence as a situation in which a potential Challenger 
must perceive the deterrer’s threats (Defender) as capable and credible for retaliation. She 
thought that although the impact of capabilities on deterrence has been extensively 
analysed in the literature, the core problem of effective deterrence lies in the issue of 
credible intentions. In other words, potential attackers (Challengers) need to believe that the 
Defender’s threats are credible and that they are willing to carry out these threats, 
                                                            
1 The use of positive incentives to get the target country to change its foreign policy. 
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otherwise a Defender is bluffing and deterrence success is based on luck. Danilovic mainly 
focuses on extended deterrence, which she identifies as the attempt by one state (Defender) 
to prevent another state (Challenger) from initiating or escalating a conflict with an ally of 
the defender (Protégé). The main function of deterrence therefore is the prevention of some 
action from happening. In the military context, deterrence entails preventing the adversary 
from using force. Deterrence theory therefore searches for the conditions that prevent war 
(Danilovic 2002, 48).  
The authors mentioned above all have a slightly different definition of deterrence. 
Taking them all into consideration, I think the most workable definition of deterrence is: the 
capacity of one state (Defender) to deter another state (Challenger) from attacking, meaning 
that the Defender can convince the Challenger that the cost of the use of military force to 
achieve foreign policy will outweigh the benefits. This threat must be credible for deterrence 
to actually be ‘deterrence’ and the threats must be explicit so that the Challenger does not 
have to guess about the Defender’s intentions. When one state (Defender) prevents another 
state (Challenger) from initiating or escalating a conflict with an ally of the defender 
(Protégé) it becomes extended deterrence. This definition combines all aspects that the 
abovementioned authors used.  
Two-level and Three-level Extended Deterrence Models 
Two-Party Extended Deterrence Game models are the most widely used in extended 
deterrence theory. Suzanne Werner states that most authors assume that the immediate 
target (in most cases the Protégé) of the Challenger’s attack will always retaliate. She 
assumes that since the target’s decision does not change, this actor is not an integral part of 
the strategic calculation (Werner 2000, 723).  
The Two-Party Extended Deterrence Game has four generic outcomes. The game 
ends in the continuation of the Status Quo if the Challenger chooses to take no action at 
Node 1. The game ends in a Bilateral War if the Challenger chooses to attack the Protégé 
and the Defender chooses not to intervene at Node 2, which causes deterrence to fail 
(Werner 2000, 724). At Node 3 the game has two possible outcomes: if the Challenger backs 
down when the Defender joins its ally, the game ends in Challenger Defeated and deterrence 
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is successful; if the Challenger presses on, the game ends in Multilateral War and deterrence 
failed. See Figure 1 for a visualisation of the model. 
Two-Level Extended Deterrence Model2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephen Quackenbush (2006) recognizes Werner’s claim that the immediate target of 
the Challenger will always retaliate, and therefore “the role of the pawn in extended 
deterrence does not model the pawn as one of the players” (Kilgour and Zagare 1994), 
however, he dares to argue that the inclusion of the Protégé provides a more complete 
model. Quackenbush states that Two-Party Extended Deterrence Games rely on the often 
hidden assumptions that states will always respond to direct challenges. However, this 
assumption contradicts theories of direct deterrence, which leads to the assumption that 
analysing all three actors in an extended deterrence game would offer a more consistent 
approach to the problem (Quackenbush 2006, 581).  
Quackenbush’ Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game has seven generic outcomes. 
The game ends in the continuation of the Status Quo if the Challenger chooses to cooperate 
(take no action) at Node 1, or the Challenger decides to attack either the Protégé or the 
Defender. At Nodes 2a and 2b, the Protégé and the Defender have to respectively choose to 
                                                            
2 Figure 1: Quackenbush 2006, 572. 
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concede to the Challenger or to resist its attack. If the Protégé or the Defender concede, the 
game ends in favour of the Challenger and the status quo is changed. At Nodes 3a and 3b, 
the Defender and the Protégé need to choose between coming to their ally’s aid when they 
have respectively resisted the Challenger, or whether they choose to stay out. When the 
Defender or the Protégé choose to stay out, deterrence fails and the game ends in either 
Bilateral War – Protégé or Bilateral War Defender. At Nodes 4a and 4b the Challenger must 
choose whether they press on their advance, which results in Multilateral War and 
deterrence fails, or whether the Challenger backs down, resulting in Challenger Defeated 
and deterrence succeeds. The seven possible outcomes of the three-level extended 
deterrence game therefore are: Status Quo, Protégé Concedes (deterrence failure), Defender 
Concedes (deterrence failure), Bilateral War – Protégé (deterrence failure), Bilateral War – 
Defender (deterrence failure), Multilateral War (deterrence failure) and Challenger Defeated 
(deterrence success) (Quackenbush 2006, 565-567). See Figure 2 for a visualisation of the 
model.   
Relevancy for Deterrence Theory 
As Werner (2000) argued, many authors use the Two-Level Extended Deterrence Game as 
the basis for their research. Therefore, most authors examine the options available to the 
Challenger and the Defender, not including the Protégé as an actor in the model. Huth and 
Russet, Lebow and Stein, and Danilovic based their research on the Two-Level Extended 
Deterrence Game, as they measured cases where the Challenger and the Defender were 
relevant actors and the role of the Protégé was not examined. Quackenbush concludes that 
the Three-Level Extended Deterrence game offers better explanations of whether and whom 
a Challenger should attack (Quackenbush 2006, 582). Taking into account the general debate 
within Deterrence Theory, about the question when deterrence is successful or not, makes 
further analysis of alternative models necessary. Examining the role of the Protégé in 
extended deterrence can lead to new insights in the general debate, or it would cause the 
Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game to be irrelevant.  
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Three-Level Extended Deterrence Model3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
3 Figure 1: Quackenbush 2006, 565. 
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Concept Analysis 
Concepts are an essential resource for the development of theories. Therefore it is necessary 
that the qualities of concepts that are used within a discipline are well developed and of high 
standard, otherwise the reliability and validity of research outcomes can be questionable. 
The development of such concepts can be done by executing concept analysis. Concept 
analysis has its roots in the research design of philosophical inquiry, which states that 
researchers use intellectual analysis to clarify the meaning of the subjects they are 
researching (Botes 2002, 24). Botes states that there are four principles that constitute to 
the quality of a concept: 
 Epistemological principle: concepts are clearly defined and well differentiated from 
other concepts. 
 Logical principle: concepts are coherent and have a systematic relation to other 
concepts. 
 Pragmatic principle: concepts are applicable to the world or operationalized. 
 Linguistic principle: concepts are appropriate to their use in context (2002, 24). 
Wilson (1963) states that conceptual questions must be isolated from other 
questions: in this thesis the conceptual question is whether the Protégé plays a significant 
role in determining extended deterrence success. Answering this question gives more depth 
to the concept of extended deterrence and could offer new insights for the debate between 
Richard Lebow and Paul Huth over when extended deterrence is successful. On the other 
hand, answering this question could prove that the Three-Level Extended Deterrence Game 
does not offer alternative insights to the Two-Level Extended Deterrence Game, which 
would also help to narrow the concept.  
Deterrence as a basic concept is the capacity of one state (Defender) to deter 
another state (Challenger) from attacking, meaning that the Defender can convince the 
Challenger that the cost of the use of military force to achieve foreign policy will outweigh 
the benefits. This threat must be credible for deterrence to actually be ‘deterrence’ and the 
threats must be explicit so that the Challenger does not have to guess what the intentions of 
the Defender are. When one state (Defender) prevents another state (Challenger) from 
initiating or escalating a conflict with an ally of the defender (Protégé) it becomes extended 
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deterrence. When extended deterrence is successful is still controversial to this date, as 
Lebow and Stein argued that it is hard to measure when deterrence succeeds as leaders of a 
Challenger state will not speak or write about their adversary’s success in deterring them. 
While you can say that when war does not break out, deterrence is successful, often it is 
hard to say if the Challenger had any intention to attack in the first place, which makes 
defining deterrence success difficult. 
Lebow and Stein argued that Huth and Russet’s theoretical perception of the concept 
extended deterrence was flawed. The problem whether extended deterrence succeeded or 
whether extended deterrence failed can be analysed on many different levels. One of these 
levels is the Game Theoretic model that lies at the basis of deterrence analysis: the Two-
Level Extended Deterrence Game. Huth and Russet, Lebow and Stein, and Danilovic each 
make explicit or inexplicit use of the Two-Level Extended Deterrence model. Quackenbush 
proposed the Three-Level Extended Deterrence model as he thought that his model offered 
the possibility for a more complete analysis of extended deterrence problems. However, 
Quackenbush himself left something out of his research, as he states in his article:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Some readers might be surprised that the game ends following Protégé’s concession 
at node 2a (or Defender’s concession at node 2b), rather than allowing for the 
possibility that Defender could choose to resist Challenger despite Protégé’s 
concession. To be sure, the inclusion of such a choice for Defender would expand the 
model’s empirical domain and provide the proper context for asking whether 
Challenger would attack a weak and conciliatory Protégé if there were some probability 
that Defender would nevertheless fight. In addition, this would more fully integrate the 
role of Defender’s credibility in extended deterrence by allowing consideration of 
Defender’s threat to respond to a challenge even if Protégé concedes. But the 
additional choice for Defender would further complicate an already complex game and 
divert attention away from this article’s main focus on whom Challenger should attack. 
In future research, however, I intend to expand the model by allowing for this 
possibility to gain a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between direct and 
extended deterrence” (Quackenbush 2006, 566).  
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The purpose of this concept analysis of extended deterrence is to see whether the Three-
Party Extended Deterrence Game makes the Protégé a significant player in determining 
deterrence success. I will further develop Quackenbush’ model by adding the option for the 
Defender to resist the Challenger, even though the Protégé chooses to concede. I believe 
that the addition of this possibility will complete Quackenbush’ model, so further 
conclusions can be derived about the relevancy of the Protégé as an actor.  
The concept analysis will be structured as follows: first, the Three-Party Extended 
Deterrence Game will be briefly compared to the Two-Party Extended Deterrence Game. 
Second, the Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game will be analysed in depth. Last, the gap 
in Quackenbush’ model, as stated above, will be filled, to see what happens when the 
Protégé concedes but the Defender chooses to resist the Challenger.   
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Comparison Two-Party and Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game 
 
As discussed above, I will outline the main differences between the Two-Party and the 
Three-Party Extended Deterrence Games4. The main difference between the two models is 
that the Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game includes the Protégé as the third player and 
strategic actor in the model. Werner argued that the immediate target of an attack will 
always retaliate if he is attacked (2000, 723). If this is the case, than the Protégé will always 
retaliate against the attacks of a Challenger, therefore becoming an irrelevant actor to 
examine in a model. Quackenbush argues that theories of direct deterrence often focus on 
the credibility of the Defender’s threats and theories of extended deterrence give perfect 
credibility to the state that is challenged. Quackenbush therefore assumes that the dilemma 
in direct deterrence (will the target respond or not?) is not present in extended deterrence, 
as the target of a challenge would always choose to retaliate (Quackenbush 2006, 572-573). 
Quackenbush believes that the Protégé does not automatically retaliate, which leads to the 
assumption that the Protégé can be a significant actor in the determination of deterrence 
success.  
 
Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game 
 
The Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game has seven possible outcomes. The seven 
possible outcomes of the Three-Level Extended Deterrence Game are: Status Quo, Protégé 
Concedes (deterrence failure), Defender Concedes (deterrence failure), Bilateral War – 
Protégé (deterrence failure), Bilateral War – Defender (deterrence failure), Multilateral War 
(deterrence failure) and Challenger Defeated (deterrence success) (Quackenbush 2006, 565-
567). Quackenbush assumes that the actors in his model are rational and therefore, to be 
rational, each player is able to order the outcomes according to its preferences. The 
preferences of each actor will now be outlined. 
 
 
                                                            
4 The Two-Level Extended Deterrence Figure can be found on page 9. 
   The Three-Level Extended Deterrence Figure can be found on page 11.  
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Challenger 
The Challenger seeks to upset the status quo, in order to do this he tries to deter his 
adversaries and gain an advantage for as little cost as possible. Two outcomes give the 
Challenger the advantage that it seeks: Protégé Concedes and Defender Concedes. Given the 
fact that causing a stronger state to concede rewards more gains than causing a weaker 
state to concede, the Challenger prefers Defender Concedes over Protégé Concedes. In the 
Challenger’s case, deterrence is successful if he gets both the Protégé and the Defender to 
concede, as the Challenger was looking for easy gains and not for war. The third preference 
therefore is maintaining the Status Quo. Given the fact that the Protégé is the weaker state 
of the two, the Challenger prefers a Bilateral War – Protégé over a Bilateral War – Defender, 
but the Challenger prefers any bilateral war over fighting a Multilateral War. Challenger 
Defeated is the least favoured outcome of the Challenger, on about equal footing with 
fighting a Multilateral War. Whether the Challenger prefers a multilateral war or backing 
down depends on the nature of the Challenger. The Challenger’s threat is only credible when 
it prefers Multilateral War over Challenger Defeated. Quackenbush therefore defined two 
types of Challengers: Hard Challengers, who have a credible threat, and Soft Challengers, 
who have no credible threat (Quackenbush 2006, 567).  
 
Defender 
The Defender has the goal of keeping the Challenger from changing the status quo; however, 
it does not want to change the status quo itself. The Defender therefore gains when the 
Challenger needs to back down after meeting resistance from the Protégé and/or the 
Defender. Challenger Defeated therefore is the most preferred outcome, followed by the 
Status Quo. Given the fact that the Defender cannot choose between Challenger Defeated 
and Status Quo the preference order can be left open without altering the results of the 
research. When the Challenger decides to attack, however, the Defender prefers that the 
Challenger gains from the Protégé rather than the Defender. The Defender therefore prefers 
Protégé Concedes to Defender Concedes to Bilateral War – Protégé to Bilateral War – 
Defender. If the Protégé fights a bilateral war with the Challenger, and the Defender would 
choose to concede, the lack of commitment to the Protégé would become apparent. 
Therefore the Defender prefers Protégé Concedes to Bilateral War – Protégé, as this offers a 
chance where the Protégé concedes as well and the lack of commitment would be hidden. 
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Moreover, the Defender prefers to fight the Challenger with the support of the Protégé 
rather than fighting the Challenger alone, which results in the Defender preferring 
Multilateral War to Bilateral War – Defender. The last choice the Defender has to make is 
choosing between Bilateral – War Protégé and Multilateral War (Quackenbush 2006, 567-
568).  
Alliance politics come into play here, which separate the Defender into two subtypes: 
reliable allies will prefer to fight a Multilateral War and unreliable allies will prefer Bilateral 
War – Protégé. The threat of the Challenger is supposed to be capable, which means that 
when the Challenger executes his threat, the Defender will be disadvantaged. This means 
that the Defender prefers Status Quo to all possible conflict options. Moreover, as conceding 
to the Challenger is some kind of loss, the Defender prefers Status Quo to Defender 
Concedes. There are three more types of Defender: Unconditionally Hard Defenders will 
prefer to resist at node 2b no matter the choices of the Protégé and the Challenger; 
Conditionally Hard Defenders will only resist the Challenger if the Protégé will choose to 
resist as well, therefore preferring Multilateral War to Defender Concedes, but Defender 
Concedes to Bilateral War – Defender; Soft Defenders will prefer conceding to any threats 
made by the Challenger.  
Combining the subtypes of Defender in extended deterrence: Reliable and Unreliable; 
and the three subtypes in direct deterrence: Unconditionally Hard, Conditionally Hard and 
Soft, result in six different types of Defender (Quackenbush 2006, 568).  
 
Protégé 
The preferences for the Protégé are equal to those of the defender, but Protégé and 
Defender should swap positions in its ordering. Challenger Defeated is the most favourable 
outcome for the Protégé, followed by the Status Quo. Furthermore, the Protégé prefers 
Defender Concedes to Protégé Concedes, Bilateral War – Defender to Bilateral War – Protégé, 
Defender Concedes to Bilateral War – Defender, Bilateral War – Defender to Bilateral War – 
Protégé and Multilateral War to Bilateral War – Protégé.  
This results in the following ordering for the Protégé: Challenger Defeated > Status Quo > 
Defender Concedes > [Multilateral War, Bilateral War – Defender] > Protégé Concedes > 
Bilateral War – Defender. The Protégé can also be either a Reliable or an Unreliable ally and 
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can also be Unconditionally Hard, Conditionally Hard or Soft, which result in six types of 
Protégé as well.  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Outcome Matrix 
The equilibria of these preferences can be found in a subgame perfect equilibria outcome 
matrix. The subgame perfect equilibrium makes sure that all choices that are made in an 
equilibrium are rational and where the preferences are common knowledge. The 
combination of the different types of players makes one game. For example, a combination 
can be made between a Hard Challenger, a Reliable/Conditionally Hard Defender and an 
Unreliable/Hard Protégé. There are two types of Challenger, two types of Defender and six 
types of Protégé, which results in a total of 72 possible games. Quackenbush states that 
these games can be halved, because a Soft Challenger will always choose to cooperate, 
which will result in the Status Quo as the subgame equilibrium outcome of all 36 games 
where  the Challenger is Soft. The other 36 games, where the Challenger is Hard, were 
analysed by Quackenbush (2006, 569). The games are displayed in the Table below5 
Quackenbush found the subgame perfect equilibrium of each game by using backwards 
induction. He found that when the Defender is Soft, the equilibrium outcome would be 
Defender Concedes, without having to differentiate between the reliability of the Defender 
or the type of the Protégé. Furthermore, if the Protégé is Soft, the outcome would always be 
                                                            
5 Table1: Quackenbush 2006, 570 
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Protégé Concedes. Quackenbush found that deterrence was most successful when the 
Defender and the Protégé were both Hard and Reliable. Quackenbush further differentiated 
in equilibria found when the Defender and the Protégé both had capable threats, when only 
the defender had a capable threat and when neither the Defender nor the Protégé had a 
capable threat.  
 
Defender And Protégé Have A Capable Threat 
In games where the Defender and the Protégé both had capable threats, Quackenbush 
assumes that the Challenger will always prefer the Status Quo to any scenario involving war, 
which means that the threat of a Bilateral War is capable of deterring the Challenger. Under 
perfect information, war would never occur in cases where both the Defender and the 
Protégé have a capable threat. Zagare and Kilgour found this outcome as well in two-player 
deterrence games (2000). This implies that the Protégé should, in theory, be capable of 
deterring a Challenger when both the Defender and Protégé have a capable threat. The 
problem for the concept extended deterrence that arises from this finding is that when the 
Protégé is capable of deterring the Challenger on its own, it would be direct deterrence 
(Quackenbush 2006, 570).  
 
Defender Has a Capable Threat 
When the Defender has a capable threat, but the Protégé does not, there is a possibility for 
conflict. Depending on the type of Defender there is a possibility for Bilateral War – Protégé 
with the Challenger. In this case, the Protégé is not capable of deterring the Challenger on its 
own. The result is that the Challenger prefers to fight a Bilateral War – Protégé over Status 
Quo and Status Quo over Bilateral War – Defender and Multilateral War. Quackenbush 
found, as can be seen in Table 1, that the equilibrium in 33 of the 36 cases were identical 
when only the defender had a capable threat to when the Defender and Protégé both had 
capable threats. The differences all lead to Bilateral War – Protégé, which is the result 
because the Protégé chose to fight even though the Defender was unreliable. This finding 
leads me to assume that the Protégé is very dependent of the Defender (Quackenbush 2006, 
571).  
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Defender And Protégé Have No Capable Threat 
When the Protégé and the Defender do not have a capable threat, then they are not able to 
deter a Challenger by itself. The Challenger will therefore prefer any bilateral war to the 
status quo. However, the combination of the two states will lead to a capable threat, which 
causes the Challenger to prefer the Status Quo to Multilateral War. Quackenbush also found, 
as can be seen in Table 1, that the equilibrium in 34 of the 36 cases is identical to the 
equilibria when only the Defender has a capable threat. Moreover, when the Protégé is 
Unreliable, there is a chance that the Defender chooses to fight even though the Protégé 
chose to concede, which results in  Bilateral War – Defender (Quackenbush 2006, 571).  The 
last mentioned step will be analysed in more detail when I add this possibility to the Three-
Party Extended Deterrence Game.  
Incomplete information 
 
Quackenbush further analysed his model under incomplete information, as in reality, all 
parties seldom have full information as to what their intentions are. While I expected 
Quackenbush to further elaborate on the role of the Protégé in this section, he mainly 
focused on the question whom the Challenger should attack in this part. Furthermore, 
Quackenbush only studies Conditionally Hard players in his study, allowing only their 
reliability to vary. By doing this, Quackenbush wanted to explain the effect of alliance 
reliability on the target decisions of the Challenger. He focused on a situation where neither 
Defender nor Protégé are able to deter Challenger alone, but rather had to work together to 
successfully deter the Challenger. While further analysis of deterrence under incomplete 
information offers the most practical applicable knowledge and insights into the working of 
deterrence, I will focus on the complete information analysis only, as it works best to analyse 
the additional choice I will add to the Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game of 
Quackenbush.   
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Developing the Model 
In Quackenbush’ model the game ends if the Protégé chooses to concede at node 2a (or 
when the Defender concedes at node 2b). He states that the inclusion of the possibility for 
the Defender to resist the Challenger even when the Protégé chooses to concede would 
further complicate an already complicated model. However, I dare to argue that the addition 
of this possibility is not that complicated at all. In Figure 3 I have visualised the addition of 
this possibility to Quackenbush’ model. Quackenbush stated that the additional choice 
would divert attention away from his article’s main focus, which was the question whom the 
Challenger should target. The inclusion of this choice, however, would destroy the practical 
use of his model in examining the added function of the Protégé. I therefore believe that 
Quackenbush deliberately left this possibility out of his model. In this section I will further 
contemplate on the inclusion of the possibility for the Defender to resist the Challenger even 
when the Protégé concedes. I believe that adding this possibility for the defender would turn 
the game back into a two-party extended deterrence game, which would make the role of 
the Protégé in extended deterrence insignificant.  
The three-level extended deterrence game of Quackenbush has seven generic 
outcomes. While several steps are added in my modification of Quackenbush’ model, there 
are still seven generic outcomes. The game ends in the continuation of the Status Quo if the 
Challenger chooses to cooperate (take no action) at Node 1, or whether the Challenger 
decides to attack either the Protégé or the Defender. At Nodes 2a and 2b, the Protégé and 
Defender have to respectively choose to concede to the Challenger or to resist its attack. If 
the Protégé or the Defender concedes, the game ends in favour of the Challenger and the 
status quo is changed.  
In Quackenbush’ model this is the end of the game, as he stated that the inclusion of 
the possibility for the Defender to resist the Challenger would further complicate an already 
complicated model. As shown in Figure 3, I have added the option for the Defender to resist 
the Challenger even if the Protégé chooses to concede. In my modified model, the Defender 
gets to choose at Node 3 whether he concedes, which leads to Defender Concedes and the 
game ends still, or whether the Defender chooses to resist the challenger which leads 
straight to Node 5 and the game continues. At Nodes 4a and 4b, the Defender and the 
Protégé need to choose between coming to their ally’s aid when they have respectively 
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resisted the Challenger, or whether they choose to stay out. When the Defender or the 
Protégé choose to stay out, deterrence fails and the game ends in either Bilateral War – 
Protégé or Bilateral War Defender. At Nodes 5a, 5b and 5c the Challenger must choose 
whether they press on their advance, which results in Multilateral War and deterrence fails, 
or whether the Challenger backs down, resulting in Challenger Defeated and deterrence 
succeeds.  
 While I have added one optional path to the model, there are still seven possible 
outcomes of the Three-Level Extended Deterrence Game: Status Quo, Protégé Concedes 
(deterrence failure), Defender Concedes (deterrence failure), Bilateral War – Protégé 
(deterrence failure), Bilateral War – Defender (deterrence failure), Multilateral War 
(deterrence failure) and Challenger Defeated (deterrence success). Quackenbush’ Subgame 
Perfect Equilibrium Outcome Matrix would not change either, as the situation described 
above is the combination of a Reliable/Unconditionally Hard Defender with an 
Unreliable/Soft or Reliable/Soft Protégé. The Protégé in this case is Soft, therefore chooses 
to always concede to the Challenger. Translating this to a real world scenario: a weak state 
with no credible threat and no power is challenged by a stronger state. The weaker state 
(Protégé) is protected by a stronger state (Defender) and this Defender has key strategic 
interests in this particular weak state. This leads the Defender to be Reliable/Unconditionally 
Hard, as it would always come to the aid of its Protégé as it is in its key strategic interest. 
Adding this option shows that deterrence success is mainly dependent on the Defender.  
Quackenbush found, as can be seen in Table 1, that the equilibrium of 33 of the 36 
cases, when both the Protégé and the Defender had a capable threat were identical to when 
only the defender had a capable threat. Moreover, Quackenbush found that when neither 
the Protégé, nor the Defender had a capable threat, the equilibrium in 34 of the 36 cases is 
identical to that obtained when only the Defender has a capable threat. This led me to 
assume that if the Defender is willing to fight the Challenger, even though the Protégé is 
unreliable, the outcome is a bilateral war between Challenger and Defender. Taking the 
above analysis into consideration I believe the role of the protégé to be insignificant in 
determining deterrence success.  
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Three-party Extended Deterrence Game Model – Protégé Concedes: 
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Conclusion 
The main goal of this thesis has been to analyse the role of the Protégé in extended 
deterrence. The research question was: does the Protégé play a significant role in 
determining extended deterrence success? I have executed a concept analysis with the 
purpose to clarify the meaning of the concept extended deterrence and the interactions 
between the Protégé, the Defender and the Challenger in an extended deterrence 
framework. Moreover, I sought to bring new insights to the debate between Paul Huth and  
Richard Lebow over defining when extended deterrence can be considered successful. The 
most basic conclusion is that the Three-Level Extended Deterrence Game does not offer new 
insights to the deterrence debate that the Two-Level Extended Deterrence Game did not 
already offer.  
 Quackenbush found in his study that over 90 per cent of the equilibria that he found 
in extended deterrence games had the same outcome when only the Defender possessed a 
capable threat against the Challenger. Moreover, adding the option for the Defender to 
come to the aid of the Protégé while the Protégé chose to concede would also lead to a 
situation where the Protégé did not appear to be a significant actor in determining 
deterrence success. I therefore want to conclude by saying that future studies should avoid 
going into too much detail about the role of the Protégé in extended deterrence. However, 
Werner’s assumption that the immediate target of the Challenger’s attack will always 
retaliate (2000, 723) should be altered somewhat. While I do agree with the assumption by 
Kilgour and Zagare (1994) that “the role of the pawn in extended deterrence does not model 
the pawn as one of the players”, there are some dimensions to the decisions of the Protégé 
that Werner’s theory ignores.  
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 As the addition of the possibility for the Defender to resist the Challenger showed, 
the Defender can still choose to fight a bilateral war when the Protégé concedes. Therefore, 
the Protégé should not have to fight back on every occasion where it is challenged by an 
adversary. The main conclusion of this thesis therefore is that deterrence is highly 
dependent on the willingness and capability of the Defender to stand up against a Challenger 
and that the role of the Protégé is not significant in determining deterrence success.  
 
 Since my findings do not shed new light on the concept of extended deterrence, it is 
hard to apply these findings to the debate between Huth and Lebow. However, I can add 
something to the debate. First, the role of the Protégé should not be important in finding 
cases of deterrence success. Second, researchers should continue to focus on the Two-Party 
Extended Deterrence Game. Third, researchers should look for alternative and creative ways 
to come up with ways  to determine deterrence success, as Quackenbush did and as I tried in 
this thesis. 
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